System interview
Corvid Design Enclave
- Organization
- Corvid Microelectronics Inc. (fictional)
- Framework
- NIST SP 800-172 Rev. 3 — Enhanced Security Requirements for Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information
- Exported
- 2026-11-22
- Answered
- 81 of 81 questions
- This file holds
- Interview only
1. System identification
| Question | Answer |
|---|---|
| System name | Corvid Design Enclave |
| Organization name | Corvid Microelectronics Inc. (fictional) |
| System owner (name and title) | Aiko Matsuda, Chief Technology Officer |
| Security officer / ISSO (name and title) | Rafael Quintero, Director of Security Engineering |
| Describe the system | Corvid Microelectronics designs radiation-hardened ASICs for satellites supporting critical national security programs. The Corvid Design Enclave holds chip designs, process design kits and verification results that are CUI and export-controlled. The enclave is a private cloud of electronic design automation (EDA) servers in Corvid's data center with 80 thin-client workstations. Designs arrive from government customers through a secure exchange, are developed and verified inside the enclave and leave as tape-out packages sent to an accredited foundry over an encrypted dedicated link. The enclave applies NIST SP 800-172 Rev. 3 enhanced requirements because the programs it supports are high-value targets of advanced persistent threats. |
| What kinds of CUI does the system handle? | Controlled Technical Information (CTI); Export-controlled (ITAR / EAR); Proprietary business information received under contract |
| Why is the SSP needed? | DFARS 252.204-7012; Other federal contract clause; Prime contractor / customer flow-down |
| Operational status | Operational |
2. Boundary and environment
| Question | Answer |
|---|---|
| Where is CUI stored, processed or transmitted? | On-premises servers |
| Cloud platforms in scope | None |
| How many people use the system? | 51-250 |
| Types of users | Employees; Contractors; Privileged administrators |
| Physical locations in scope | Design center and data center in Albuquerque, New Mexico |
| Do users access the system remotely? | No remote access |
| Describe the network and system boundary | Thin clients connect to virtual desktops on the EDA cluster. The enclave is split into design, verification, management and transfer zones. Components that fail authentication or configuration checks cannot join the network (802.1X with posture checks). |
| Connections to external systems | Government customer secure exchange (transfer zone, manual review). Encrypted dedicated link to the accredited foundry for tape-out only. |
| External service providers | The accredited foundry receives tape-out packages. EDA tool vendors provide licences through an on-premises licence server; no vendor access. |
3. Identity and access
| Question | Answer |
|---|---|
| Identity provider / directory | On-premises Active Directory |
| Multi-factor authentication coverage | All users, all access |
| MFA methods in use | FIDO2 / hardware security key; Smart card / PIV / CAC |
| How is privileged (admin) access handled? | Just-in-time privileged access through a PAM platform with dual authorization for tape-out, key management and baseline changes; all privileged sessions are recorded. |
| How are accounts requested, approved, reviewed and removed? | Accounts are approved by the program lead and security, disabled after 21 days of inactivity and reviewed monthly; contractor accounts expire with their contract. |
| Remote access methods | None |
| Wireless access to the system | No wireless |
| Mobile device management | Mobile devices are not permitted to access CUI |
| Session lock, logout and lockout settings | Virtual desktops lock after 5 minutes and disconnect after 30; lockout after 3 failed attempts for 60 minutes |
4. Endpoints and infrastructure
| Question | Answer |
|---|---|
| Endpoint operating systems | Linux |
| Server platforms | Linux; Virtualization (VMware / Hyper-V); Containers / Kubernetes |
| Endpoint protection / EDR | SentinelOne |
| Firewalls and boundary protection | No internet access from the enclave. Zone firewalls enforce default-deny. Deception hosts in each zone alert on any contact. |
| Is the CUI environment segmented from the rest of the network? | Yes, a dedicated enclave |
| Encryption at rest | LUKS; Database / application-level encryption |
| Encryption in transit | TLS 1.2 or later; IPsec / SSL VPN |
| Is cryptography protecting CUI FIPS-validated? | Yes, everywhere CUI is protected |
| Email and collaboration platform | No email in the enclave; an internal wiki and ticketing system run inside it |
| Configuration baselines and enforcement | CIS Benchmarks; DISA STIGs |
| How are changes to the system requested, reviewed and approved? | Infrastructure is defined in code; every change is peer reviewed, approved by the change board and deployed by pipeline. Systems are rebuilt from known-good images monthly. |
| How is the hardware and software inventory maintained? | Automated discovery feeds an authoritative inventory every hour; unknown devices are blocked |
| Patch management tool and timelines | Critical patches within 7 days after lab testing; others within 30 days |
| Vulnerability scanning tool and frequency | Continuous agent-based scanning plus weekly network scans; penetration testing twice a year |
| Backups | Immutable backups to an isolated vault every 4 hours; restores tested monthly |
5. Monitoring and response
| Question | Answer |
|---|---|
| Log collection / SIEM | Elastic |
| Who reviews logs and alerts, and how often? | Security operations center staffed 24/7; threat hunting weekly and when indicators warrant |
| Audit log retention period | 3 years |
| Time synchronization source | Stratum-1 GPS time servers inside the enclave |
| Incident response capability | Documented plan and trained team |
| How and how often is incident response tested? | Quarterly exercises, including an annual purple team exercise |
| How are incidents reported externally? | Government customers within 24 hours; DIBNet within 72 hours |
| Who performs system maintenance? | Corvid staff only, on site; hardware returned for repair has storage removed and destroyed first. |
6. Physical, media and personnel
| Question | Answer |
|---|---|
| Physical access controls | Badge / electronic access control; Visitor log and escort; Cameras; Alarm system; Locked server room / rack |
| Safeguards at alternate work sites (home offices) | Not applicable: enclave work happens only in the design center |
| Media protection practices | Removable media prohibited; CUI media marked; Media sanitized per NIST SP 800-88; Paper CUI shredded |
| Personnel screening before access to CUI | Background check; Citizenship / U.S. person verification; Non-disclosure agreement |
| Termination and transfer process | Documented checklist, access removed same day |
| Security awareness training | Quarterly training on APT tactics, social engineering and insider threat with practical exercises |
| Role-based training for administrators and security staff | Role-based training for EDA administrators, SOC analysts and developers twice a year |
7. Policies and governance
| Question | Answer |
|---|---|
| Status of policies, plans and procedures | |
| Access control policy | Documented and approved |
| Awareness and training policy | Documented and approved |
| Audit and accountability policy | Documented and approved |
| Configuration management policy / plan | Documented and approved |
| Identification and authentication policy | Documented and approved |
| Incident response plan | Documented and approved |
| Maintenance policy | Documented and approved |
| Media protection policy | Documented and approved |
| Personnel security policy | Documented and approved |
| Physical protection policy | Documented and approved |
| Risk assessment policy | Documented and approved |
| Security assessment and monitoring policy | Documented and approved |
| System and communications protection policy | Documented and approved |
| System and information integrity policy | Documented and approved |
| Security planning policy | Documented and approved |
| System and services acquisition policy | Documented and approved |
| Supply chain risk management plan | Draft |
| Rules of behavior / acceptable use | Documented and approved |
| Plan of action and milestones (POA&M) process | Documented and approved |
| How often are policies reviewed and updated? | Every six months |
| Organization-defined parameters (ODPs) | Defined our own values |
| Risk assessments | Threat-informed risk assessment every quarter using commercial threat intelligence and government briefings |
| Security control assessments | Annual independent assessment against NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 3 and SP 800-172 Rev. 3 |
| Supplier and acquisition security | Foundry and EDA vendors are vetted and contractually bound to security requirements; incoming hardware is verified against known-good images. The supply chain plan is being updated for SP 800-172 Rev. 3. |
| Anything else an assessor should know? | Enhanced requirements are applied to the whole enclave; there are no excluded components. |
8. Follow-up questions
| Question | Answer |
|---|---|
| How is the integrity of the EDA tool binaries verified? | Tools are installed only from vendor media whose signatures are verified, and file integrity monitoring compares them with recorded hashes daily. |
| What diversity or deception measures are in place? | Deception hosts and decoy credentials are deployed in every zone; verification servers run a different OS distribution from design servers. |